Why did Islam build an empire?

Part Two: History of the Muslims in Germany I. The beginnings: «Turkish booty», mercenaries and ambassadors As mentioned above, Muslims have been in Germany repeatedly since the Middle Ages, albeit in very small numbers and mostly not in Spain, Italy or the Balkans for longer time. In this respect, they represented exotic phenomena that aroused curiosity, but hardly offered any reason for in-depth study of their religion. Regardless of this, as shown, all sorts of ideas about Islam developed, which were shaped by the respective political, military and cultural developments. It is important to keep this in mind: The image of Islam in Germany has developed over a long period of time without broader personal contact with Muslims. It was only as a result of the military repression of the Ottoman Empire in the late 17th century in the “Great Turkish War” (1683–1699) that larger numbers of converted or forcibly baptized Ottoman Muslim prisoners of war came to Germany as “captured Turks”, even before occasionally as slaves.1 For example, a Frankish nobleman who had participated in the naval battle of Lepanto in 1571 and later in the land war took a Turkish prisoner with him to Nuremberg, who was baptized there in 1600.2 The Bavarian elector Max Emanuel brought 345 such slaves to him in 1686 Munich.3 Of the 75 “looted Turks” identified by Hartmut Heller40 for Francs, at least half were children under the age of six. Family names such as Aly, Morath, Oßmann or Soldan are said to be traced back to Ottoman origins (Ali, Murad, Osman, Sultan) .5 Some of the prisoners were accepted into the court as exotic figures together with other people from overseas (e.g. "Hofmohren"), for example in Berlin, Kassel, Hanover and Munich.6 Individuals even married into noble families, such as Maria Anna Augusta Fatma, who was buried in 1755 in the Markdorf monastery on Lake Constance, mistress of the Baden margrave Ludwig Wilhelm ("Türkenlouis") and later the wife of Count Friedrich Magnus von Castell-Remlingen, 7 or Suleika, captured in Ofen (Buda) in 1686, who grew up in a noble house and became Augustus the Strong's mistress. Her son was ennobled Count Rutkowski, her daughter married Count Bielinski.8 Others ended up in rural areas, for example in Württemberg, Franconia, Bavaria, 9 Lüneburg, Central Germany10 and Silesia.11 Hartmut Heller12 reports on officers and valets who are well accepted in society, Linen weavers, cobblers, bakers, court pastry chefs, high school teachers, mayors, hospital nurses and wives of respected professional groups, such as a "Turkish Christian" in Upper Lusatia, which was kindly remembered in an obituary in 1720. Also noteworthy is the life of the Janissary officer Hussin, who was captured in 1686 at the age of twenty in Ofen (Buda) and who came from a noble Ottoman family and was sold to a Frankish nobleman for 45 Reichstaler. Later released by «grace letter», he entered the service of a Nuremberg patrician, was baptized in 1694, married the daughter of a Laufer brandy distiller and finally continued his father-in-law's business in Schwaig as Friedrich Carl Wilhelm Benedict.13 Some of the former prisoners remained for the rest of their lives Muslims and nevertheless achieved a socially secure position.14 In some places it was possible at least to practice religious rites in sets, for example at burials.15 In the 18th century, the Muslim graves in Hanover are even said to become “tourist attractions ».16 However, many became Christians, often under social pressure to improve their status. A special case in this respect was that of the Spahi (cavalry soldier) Ibrahim, who was brought to Rückersdorf Castle by a Nuremberg nobleman in 1686. The change to Christianity and the baptism in March 1689 could be connected with his wedding two days later to a castle maid who was four months pregnant by him.17 Some people apparently converted out of conviction and entered church service. 18 Others succeeded a military career like Mehmet von Königstreu, ennobled by the elector of Hanover in 1716, who married a woman from one of the most famous Hanoverian councilors.19 For the early modern period, 166 baptisms in 69 places have been known from Bavaria, and significantly more from Germany as 500.20 Hartmut Heller217 impressively describes the life and death of Carl Osman, who was born in Constantinople in 1655, captured in 1688 off Belgrade and brought to the Franconian town of Rügland, where he was baptized in 1727 after 39 years of service as a valet in Crailsheim Castle and died in 1735 . He was able to realize his wish for a “big corpse” by paying out five cruisers to each mourning guest, which may have motivated the record number of 925 people to attend the funeral. So, according to the pastor, he died as a Christian benefactor and good example. After all, he also donated two silver candlesticks from Augsburg for 85 guilders to his baptistery.22 The enslavement of Muslim prisoners of war ended in the 18th century. Since then, individual Muslims have come to Germany in official positions, 23 such as Ahmad Rasmi Effendi, who was the first envoy to Prussia in 1763, or the Ottoman history of Muslims in Germany56 sent by Ali Aziz Effendi, who was buried in 1798 in the Hasenheide in Berlin. Others came as traders, for study purposes or as travelers.24 Large numbers of Muslims were recruited for military service, such as the Muslim Tatar, Bosniak or Albanian soldiers in the Prussian army, who were buried from 1743 in a cemetery in East Prussian Goldap, which no longer exists , or the Polish-Lithuanian Tatar Mustapha Sulkiewicz, who fell as Prime Lieutenant in the Saxon service against Prussia in the Seven Years' War in 1762 and found his final resting place in Dippoldiswalde.25 The admission of Muslims into the Prussian army also made Islam architecturally visible: in 1732, the king judged Friedrich Wilhelm I built a mosque in the Potsdam garrison, which is no longer preserved today. The name of the later Prussian "Uhlan" regiments goes back to the Turkish-Tatar word "Oğlan" (son, young man, soldier), a reminder of the original composition of these troops in the reign of Frederick the Great.26 Apparently the military predominated Theological aversions are also useful, as an anecdote from Goldap in East Prussia shows, which Muhammad Salim Abdullah reproduces in his outline of the history of the Islamic minority in Germany: 27 A Turkish officer had twins with a young girl. The Lyck consistory found that the girl had been guilty of carnal intercourse with a pagan and was therefore to be cremated. Thereupon the lieutenant wrote to the king, who reprimanded the clergy very drastically. On the other hand, the Turkish lieutenant was given the utmost permission to "make little pagans as much as he wanted". With oriental courtesy, he invited the consistory to take part in the Islamic circumcision ceremony and to be guests of his and his young wife. Overall, the religious and cultural atmosphere in Brandenburg-Prussia at that time was characterized by a comparatively high degree of tolerance, which in part probably had pragmatic reasons the overall number of immigrant Muslims is very manageable. The ideas of the Prussian King Frederick II after the first partition of Poland in 1775, to settle Tatars as soldiers and to increase the population, were not granted lasting success.29 After all, his religious tolerance showed new beginnings for future coexistence in Germany. His marginal note, written in moderate German, on a report of the General Directory in his first year of government, 1740, has become famous: All religions are the same and if the people are good as they are professed, and whom Turks and pagans came and wanted to poke the country That’s how they want to build mosquees and churches.30 King Friedrich Wilhelm III., Friedrich’s great-nephew, bought a plot of land on today's Columbiadamm in Berlin in 1798 for the burial of the Ottoman envoy Ali Aziz Effendi. This led to the development of the first, still existing Muslim cemetery on the site of the Şehitlik Mosque, which was donated to the Ottoman Empire in 1866.31 There, the "martyrs" graves of Kemal Azmi and Bahaddin Sakir, which were extensively restored a few years ago, stand out. both of which were significantly involved in the mass murder of the Armenians in World War I and were shot by Armenian assassins in Berlin in 192232 - a strange symbolism on the site of a mosque that is exemplary for communication. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the exchange with the Ottoman Empire increased in diplomacy, education and science, art, trade and, last but not least, in military terms, but not continuously. The philosopher, poet and spiritual founding father of the future Pakistan Muhammad Iqbal (born 1877) became prominent. After studying in Heidelberg and Munich, he received his doctorate in 1907 with a thesis on Persian metaphysics. In Heidelberg, the Iqbal-Ufer on the Neckar River is a reminder of its famous students.33 Some Muslims also came to the country as political refugees, 34 others as scientists, such as the Ottoman Tatar Kemaletdin Bedri, who was born in 1896 and was studying moved from Istanbul to Berlin and later became the first lecturer for the Tatar language in Germany.35 Religious questions played no role in any of this. The number of Muslims in Germany remained low overall. Individual outstanding personalities converted to Islam: 36 the Silesian Africa researcher Isaak Eduard Schnitzer, who initially converted from Judaism to Protestantism and, after being refused admission to the medical state examination, emigrated to the Ottoman Empire, where he later became governor of the Egyptian equatorial province as "Mehmed Emin Pascha"; 37 the Westphalian Gustav Adolf von Wrede, who fled from his father's placement in the military, ended up as a cabin boy in the Ottoman Empire, there advanced to the position of troop inspector and undertook fundamental voyages of discovery in Hadramaut; 38 and last but not least Karl Detroit, who fled to the Ottoman Empire as a cabin boy Son of a Prussian court musician who, decades later, represented the Ottoman Empire as Marshal at the Berlin Congress in 1878 - to the displeasure of Bismarck ("tactlessness") and the German General Staff.39 Among his descendants is the important Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet. All in all, our knowledge of Muslims in 19th century Germany has been fragmented so far, and much remains to be explored. The short colonial epoch of Germany temporarily brought about 2 million Muslims in German East Africa, Cameroon and Togo, where Islamic law partially applied, under German rule.40 Comparatively close connections to these regions still exist today, for example in education and development cooperation religious affairs, however, appear to be almost entirely in relation to Christianity. 59The First World War and the Consequences II. The First World War and the Consequences While the Muslim presence in Germany was an exception until the beginning of the 20th century, the First World War and the political developments that followed brought a larger number of Muslims into the country. The orientalist Gerhard Höpp, in particular, did a great job of researching this topic.41 Most of the Muslims who came to Germany at that time were prisoner-of-war soldiers who fought in the hundreds of thousands in the armies of the Entente powers.42 There were around 12,000 Imprisoned in the Wünstorf camp near Berlin, some in other camps mainly located in Prussia. When the German government developed the idea of ​​recruiting these prisoners for pan-Islamic ideas and thus for its own foreign policy purposes, the nearby propaganda camp Zossen was set up.43 Prisoners from the British and French armies were housed there and the first wooden mosque was built which, however, was demolished in 1930.44 Two Ottoman Tatars, Abdurraschid Ibrahim (1857–1944) and Alimjan Idris (1887–1954), were sent from Istanbul as “camp imams”. Shortly after the start of the war, the German ambassador in Constantinople suggested treating the Muslims who had been captured by Germany with particular consideration, namely observing religious regulations when it came to food and giving them the opportunity to fulfill (their) religious obligations.45 Around 1,100 Tatars declared themselves in 1915 / 16 ready to fight in the Ottoman army, 46 as well as over 1000 Arab and around 50 Indian Muslims.47 A small number of prisoners had already been sent to the Ottoman Empire as a sign of solidarity in a German-Ottoman propaganda campaign. 48 History of the Muslims in Germany60 During the war years, several hundred Muslim prisoners died in the camps; they found their final resting place in a specially created mixed denomination cemetery in Zehrensdorf, which was later destroyed; Several memorial monuments were erected there.49 After the end of the war, short-lived facilities for Muslim occupation soldiers were built, e.g. a mosque for French soldiers from North Africa and Senegal in the Gonsenheim soldiers' camp in Rhineland-Palatinate; Something similar was repeated there after the Second World War.50 On the other hand, most of the Tatars left Germany during this period; only a few dozen remained, some of which initially lived in the camps that were closed in 1924. Others settled in Berlin and took up various professions or began studying. A noteworthy community life did not develop among them, however. In isolated cases, more political activities are passed on, such as commemorative celebrations of important events in Tatar history or attempts to form anti-Bolshevik alliances, but not the formation or institutional participation in Muslim-religious community life.51 Attempts by the pro-German Tatars in the 1920s were more successful -Years of bringing Russian Muslims from Tatarstan and Turkestan to Germany for study and training.52 Other prisoners who remained in Germany, especially “defectors”, received little help after the end of the war, and some were easily deported.53 Also for Muslims from other parts of the world Germany was an attractive place to study after the First World War. Some of them later took on positions of responsibility in their country of origin and promoted a pro-German policy hostile to Great Britain and France.54 It should be borne in mind that in the growing anti-colonialist movements, the turning towards Germany to a considerable extent was based on the political motto “the enemy my enemy is my friend ”.55 In the 1920s, pan-Islamic associations, such as the “Orient Der First World War and the Consequences 61 Klub eV”, founded by Turks who fled here from 1918 in 1920, were able to flourish in Berlin the "Egyptian National Defense Committee" established in 1922 or the "Arab Association" formed in 1923, later the "Association of Arab Students in Berlin". In addition, publications emerged, including the Egyptian correspondence founded in 1921. Organ of the Egyptian National Party in Germany ”,“ Liwa el-Islam ”(Arabic banner of Islam) or“ Āzādī-e šarq ”(personal freedom of the East ).56 Accordingly, Muslim organizations were established to a considerable extent. In 1922, the Islamic Community of Berlin was founded in Berlin, which brought together members from more than 40 countries. The diversity was reflected in the board, which consisted of the Indian Abdul Jabbar Kheiri (chairman and imam), the Turkish embassy chaplain Hafiz Schükrü and the Arabic lecturer Ahmad Wali (deputy chairman) as well as the German managing director Khalid Banning.57 A list of members can be found the name of the prominent scholar Leopold Weiss / Muhammad Asad, who converted from Judaism to Islam and who, among other things, submitted an important commented translation of the Koran.58 The German-Muslim Society, Berlin eV, was formed from the community in 1930, with approx. 1800 members of different religious and ethnic backgrounds achieved some publicity.59 In Munich and Berlin, communities emerged in the 1920s that felt connected to the mystical direction of Islam (Sufism).They were inspired by the missionary trips of the Sufi teacher, singer and musician Hazrat Inayat Khan from Baroda / India, who worked for many years in various Western countries.60 The work of these communities, which mostly attracted German converts, was interrupted by National Socialism. Since the 1970s, as a result of migration processes, there have been various other associations that maintain the Sufi traditions of the respective history of origin of Muslims in Germany62 countries.61 The Naqschbandiyya-Haqqaniyya has developed into an international order with German participation since the 1970s . There are also a number of other Sufi communities.62 In 1925, a mosque of the Lahore Ahmadiyya community was built in Berlin-Wilmersdorf on Fehrbelliner Platz (see p. 144 for more on this direction). The construction was initiated by the Indian Sadr ud-Din, who also started the “Muslim Review ”.63 In 1928 the President of the Ahmadiyya gave a Friday sermon there in Lahore, in which he emphasized that Islam never had power to expand needs and will not need them in the future either. He did not need any “external power”; his successes were based on his “inner strength” .64 While the community was initially rejected by other organizations such as the Islamic Community of Berlin eV, Muslims from various countries accepted an invitation to break the fast as early as 1926.65 From the group of believers gathered around Imam Sadr ud-Din in the mosque, the interdenominational “Muslim Community” arose, which also allowed non-Muslims as extraordinary members. Some magazines with a very different focus on Islam have also been brought onto the market since that time, often only for a short period of time.66 The Lahore Ahmadiyya community in Berlin had been publishing the “Muslim Review” since 1924, which, with longer interruptions (1927/28; 1941–1985) until today under this name, albeit with a new orientation.67 It would be worthwhile to examine the Islam-related debates there (e.g. on Islamic business ethics) in more detail. In addition, other journals were published in German, German-Arabic or exclusively in Arabic.68 The Islam-Institut was established in Berlin in 1927 as the first institution with a scientific claim. In 1942 it operated as the Islamisches Zentral-Institut and from 1962 as the Zentral-Institut Islam-Archiv eV in Saarbrücken and in 1982 in Soest was rebuilt. The founder was the Aleppine engineer Mohammed Abdul Instrumentalization and Resistance in the Third Reich 63 Nafi Tschelebi, who wanted to create a bridge between the Islamic world and Germany, but also between the different Muslim schools in Germany. It comprised the three departments of culture, science and economics as well as a study office for Muslim students and brought out the magazine “Die Islamische Gegenwart ”.69 The German section of the Islamic World Congress, established in Berlin in 1932, pursued a similar goal Had set the goal of uniting Islam in Germany. During the Second World War and as a result of the division of Germany after 1945, work was interrupted, and the organization was finally deleted in 1956 as no longer existing in the register of associations. 70 III. Instrumentalization and resistance in the Third Reich The Nazi rule also brought upheavals for the Muslim communities in Germany. From 1933 onwards, the Nazi regime made attempts to instrumentalize Islam politically, also to win war allies.71 David Motadel has presented a very material-rich study, 72 which impressively documents this policy and includes initiatives on the British, American and Soviet sides that include for their part aimed at a loyalty bond and instrumentalization73. For example, the Nazi regime financially supported the Lebanese political activist Schakib Arslan, who founded the Orient Club in Berlin in 1921, later maintained a network of connections with Muslims in Germany and elsewhere from Switzerland and distributed pro-German press propaganda. It was also he who brought the extremely anti-Jewish Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amin al-Hussaini, who was fighting against the British mandate in Palestine.74 The same Amin al-Hussaini distributed scholarship money from the Nazi government to 125–150 Arab students in Germany France.75 Al-Hussaini's call for jihad against Great Britain and the Jews from Berlin was broadcast in the Middle East.76 The endeavor to make Hitler religiously the “tool of the prophet” and the twelfth imam (the messianic figure of the Twelve Shiite Islam ).77 As early as 1926, Hitler is said to have met the Indian independence fighter Inayatullah Khan al-Maschriqi, who was very impressed by him and the emerging SA.78 The German embassy in Cairo left the anti-British imperialism in the 1930s acting Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood financial support z The former Islam Institute, which had lost its importance after the accidental death of its founder in 1933 and got caught up in internal disputes, was re-established in 1941 as the Islamic Central Institute and instrumentalized for the purposes of National Socialism; al-Hussaini gave a celebratory speech on the reorganization.80 The political, non-religious aim of such activities of the Nazi regime is evident, for example, in the support of non-Muslim Indian independence activists like Subhas Chandra Bose, who wanted to combine socialism and Nazi ideology as a model for an independent India.81 Conversely Some sympathizers of the German regime primarily pursued goals related to the future of their home regions occupied by colonial powers.82 The motivation of such supporters was usually purely nationalistic - related to their region of origin - and not determined by National Socialism.83 The promises of the Nazis were determined not yet complied with.84 Nazi Germany, however, by no means enjoyed undivided support. The Egyptian businessman Sayyid al-Lauzi, for example, broke off all his business relationships with German companies due to the increasing racist tide.85 In addition, Arab Muslims (and Jews) also fell victim to National Socialist politics.86 Bernd Bauknecht has instrumentalization and resistance in a third party in a documented work Reich 65 underpins his thesis that the collaboration of Muslims with the Nazi dictatorship was limited to individuals, while the vast majority of them were subjected to repression by the regime. The "Sufi Movement e.V." also disbanded because of the Nazi takeover. 87 In a speech on the Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939, Adolf Hitler clearly expressed his dislike of the (also Muslim) peoples of the Middle East, 88 based on racism, and their mere political instrumentalization: We will continue the unrest in the Far East and in Arabia stir up. Let us think as gentlemen and see in these peoples, at best, lacquered semi-monkeys who want to feel the knuckle.89 It would be desirable if the admirers of Hitler in individual Arab milieus would take note of such statements. The racist rejection was later softened mainly for pragmatic reasons, because in the war years from 1941 soldiers were urgently wanted to stabilize rule in the conquered areas and to support the fighting at the front.90 The racist chief ideologist Heinrich Himmler spoke of "Muselgermanen", an expression that did not catch on, however.91 There was some resonance, especially in Bosnia and among the Crimean Tatars, because here - largely due to domestic political distress and persecution - the German occupying power was viewed as the lesser evil; In some cases, however, forced recruitment was also carried out. With the Islam Institute of the University of Göttingen, under the direction of the orientalist Bertold Spuler, courses for army imams ("mullah courses") were organized to look after the soldiers.92 From 1942 onwards, Muslim Soviet prisoners of war were to be used in the Soviet Union for sabotage activities in the "Company Zeppelin" , an ultimately unsuccessful project.93 On the other hand, a number of Muslims in the concentration camps operated by Nazi Germany66 were murdered.94 In addition, the Muslims recruited for military purposes suffered from considerable discrimination.95 After the liberation of Germany In 1945 the Muslims living here faced the ruins of their existence in organizational terms, and in some cases completely figuratively. The Berlin mosque was badly destroyed, the communities were in the process of dissolution.96 Mohammed Aman Hobohm, a German Muslim diplomat, took over the small Berlin community, which he headed as Imam until 1954.97 Little is known about the probably considerable number of Muslims, who came to Germany as soldiers, forced laborers or refugees during the war. Many left the country again, sometimes under duress on the basis of agreements by the Allies.98 Some former supporters of the Nazi regime were recruited for US positions during the beginning of the Cold War.99 Created in the 1950s - also with the support of the German government and the Bavarian state government - first structures for former Muslim armed forces such as the "Spiritual Administration of Muslim Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany" established in 1958. The first head imam was Nureddin Namangani, who had previously worked as a chaplain of a Muslim unit during the war and in the POW camp in Pisa. In addition, Muslim emigrants were used for purposes of the Cold War, also with connections to the CIA.100 An “Islamic distance learning” for contemporary teaching of the faith was designed, which met with some demand. In 1974 Hauptimam Ibrahimović took over the management of the clerical administration in Nuremberg, which he co-founded.101 The people she oversees and their descendants have long since become part of German society. The German Muslim League e.V., which was founded by high school students in Hamburg in 1944 and then again in 1952 and registered there in 1954, still exists today, in which Muslim Germans gathered. Representatives of the Syrian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood established Islamic centers in Aachen and Munich.102 Labor migration and asylum 67 IV. Labor migration and asylum: Islam is becoming indigenous There has been a qualitatively completely new development in the Federal Republic of Germany since the 1960s with the immigration of «Guest workers». It took place on the basis of various recruitment agreements (1961 with Turkey, 1963 with Morocco, 1965 with Tunisia, 1968 with Yugoslavia) and after the recruitment stop in 1973 through family reunification, later also in larger numbers on the basis of asylum applications. The number of Turkish citizens in the Federal Republic of Germany rose from approx. 8,600 in 1961 to over 1.5 million in 1982.103 In addition to the guest workers, a large number of Muslim asylum seekers came, in particular from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Turkey to Germany. Others came for training and advanced training purposes and some of them stayed in the country. By far the largest group, around 4 million Turkish Muslims immigrated in the wake of the recruitment agreement of 1961, but many of them have returned to Turkey. For 1987, based on the census, there were around 1.3 million Muslim Turks and around 280,000 other Muslims, a total of around 1.65 million. Around two-thirds of these were distributed among the industrial federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia (approx. 550,000), Baden-Württemberg (approx. 270,000) and Bavaria (approx. 220,000) .104 Due to the large statistical uncertainty, such data should be used cautiously; however, they can prove at least orders of magnitude. Since the 1970s, large numbers of mosque communities and also Muslim association structures have emerged - mostly in a linguistic-ethnic grouping.105 While German Muslims had so far significantly shaped developments in the country in view of the overall low numbers, Islam as a mass phenomenon now initially became a matter of “foreigners” », History of the Muslims in Germany, 68 especially from Turkey and the Balkans (cf. on the figures on p. 75ff.). Questions of religion and migration have been mixed with effects to this day. Muslim life developed only to a small extent in the GDR, especially in East Berlin and Leipzig, where some students and professionals from allied states such as Syria, Algeria and the People's Republic of Yemen lived.106 The number of Muslims in East Germany is still there today outside of Berlin very low compared to West Germany; this is now changing with the immigration of refugees. The explanations therefore largely relate to developments in the Federal Republic of Germany until reunification. In 2012, around 1.55 million Turkish nationals were among the 2.8 million people of Turkish origin in Germany. About 74% had lived for at least twenty years. Turkish guest workers at Ford in Cologne spoke to the Turkish labor minister Bülent Ecevit (left) in 1964, who pays his compatriots a visit. Labor migration and asylum 69 ren in Germany; 52% were born in Germany.107 Of course, many of them still maintain contacts with Turkey, which in turn tries to maintain its political, economic and cultural influence through a more and more structured diaspora policy108 - not unusual for a country of emigration. Religious questions are only one facet, albeit an important one: Turkish religious policy sees itself as a bulwark of secularism, a moderate center against Islamist endeavors, and also clearly distinguishes itself from Islam, which is more Arab and culturally influenced. The establishment of DİTİB109 as the German representation of the Turkish religious authority Diyanet (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı, Presidium for Religious Affairs) in 1984 mixed with questions of migration policy on both the German and Turkish sides. It is no coincidence that Turkish and German flags often adorn the interior of DİTİB mosques. At the same time, the establishment of the DİTİB marks a change in the understanding of labor migration from Turkey: While previously the prevailing idea was that the «guest workers» would return to Turkey in the medium term, the understanding has now spread that many of them will remain in Germany permanently would. Thus the time of the deliberately created temporary arrangements gradually came to an end. The connection between migration processes and Islam is also reflected on the part of the German state. A member of the second and third German Islam Conference organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior is, among others, the Turkish Community in Germany (TGD), which, according to its self-image, does not want to be seen as a religious organization, but as a representative of the Turkish “cultural minority”. It is important to promote German-Turkish cooperation, and it deals in particular with “migration-related fields of work” (Section 3.3. Of the TGD's statutes) .110 Here in particular, it is important to separate migration-related conflict situations from religious issues. There are typical conflicting interests between countries of immigration and emigration, regardless of the religious or cultural history of Muslims in Germany70. Countries of emigration tend to maintain contact with the emigrants and to provide them with institutional support, also in order to be able to use them as “ambassadors” or representatives of their interests. Immigration countries, on the other hand, have an interest in ensuring that permanent immigrants become part of the host society to the greatest possible extent, even if no assimilation is required. When Germany was still a country of emigration, it also represented the typical politics of a country of emigration; 111 today it is a country of immigration with a different political orientation. If you keep this in mind, it becomes easier to find forms of cooperation that take into account the concerns of all parties involved. Above all, it can then succeed in not forcing unnecessary or even absurd decisions on people - Turkish or German, Muslim or good democrat? There was no comparable development in the GDR. A few Muslims came together through international gatherings. In February 2014 in Frankfurt am Main, a Muslim teacher explained the ablution of prayer to first graders in denomination-oriented Islamic religious instruction. Labor migration and asylum 71 work into the country, with their religious affiliation in the background. In conjunction with the anti-religious politics of the GDR dictatorship, people hardly had the opportunity to consciously perceive other religions and their peculiarities. The comparatively few foreigners were often isolated from the general population. This fact seems to shape religious life in parts of East Germany up to the present day, as the author has learned several times from political decision-makers in the region.The Dresden social scientist Uta Karstein describes this succinctly with the “double strangeness of Islam” in the secular context of Eastern Germany.112 A Muslim infrastructure is only gradually emerging. Larger mosque construction projects such as that of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in Leipzig are rather the exception. In 2016 the Mosque landscape of Thuringia was described by the Islamic Commissioner of the Diocese of Erfurt as "pathetic" 113 - improvised places of prayer partly in shabby basement rooms comparable to the early years in West Germany. This perhaps explains why the anti-Islam movement “Pegida”, founded by a person who has often appeared criminally, was able to gain some popularity in Dresden - and only there besides Leipzig - in 2014 and again in autumn 2015, although the number of Muslims living in Saxony is vanishingly small. The much smaller parallel rallies in cities in West Germany, on the other hand, met with a multiple of counter-demonstrators and silted up miserably. Small remnants have become a reservoir for right-wing extremists and are in part under surveillance by constitutional protection authorities. The then Bishop of the Diocese of Dresden-Meißen Koch interpreted this movement as a "deep expression of spiritual and religious emptiness". 115 In view of the baselessness of the assertion that there was an "Islamization" of Germany or even Saxony, aptly described it as "insolence". that the organizers called themselves “patriots ”.116 Marie Hakenberg and Verena Klemm presented the History of Muslims in Germany72 in 2016 a commendable volume on Muslims in Saxony, which replaces prejudices with facts. It is noteworthy that the defense of the "occident", which Pegida has taken up the cause of, also at least partially refers to its Christian character. In contrast, the majority of the demonstrators seem to have no personal connection to Christianity. This is made abundantly clear by the crosses that were carried with them, which were painted with the colors of the German national flag: 117 a presumption of state and religious symbols by people who apparently did not understand either the background of the German colors or that of the cross. This is where trends that have been observed by science for some time can be seen: The English sociologist of religion Grace Davie coined the appropriate term of “vicarious religion ”.118 It refers to people who are distant themselves from the established religious scene, but who generally want it persists. If, against this background, religion and national-cultural identity are closely linked, what remains is a nationalism that has been stripped of religion and is only disguised religiously, which is instrumentalized for purposes of separation and exclusion. If politicians and government officials openly engage in talks with such people, they should bear in mind that these same diffuse fear-driven people in Dresden have for their part created a real climate of fear among Muslims and, more generally, among refugees and immigrants.119 The victims of such intimidation should not Have to watch how the perpetrators and fellow travelers are debated. The drama of the developments can also be seen in the fact that in 2014 47% of the racially motivated acts of violence were recorded in the eastern German federal states, which only make up around 20% of the total population, including 4.7%, which is a far below average proportion of foreigners.120 This includes massive group crime in the Dresden area, such as in Heidenau, Freital, Clausnitz labor migration and Asyl 73 and Bautzen in 2015 and 2016; the Federal President and the Chancellor were also insulted by the mob there. At the beginning of 2016, the Leipzig police president warned of a “pogrom mood” in Saxony.121 Former Bundestag President Thierse said that hatred and violence were more visible and audible in the east, and stated that, due to the many changes over the past 25 years, there was less consolidation in democratic and moral convictions prevail.122 In all of this, however, it should not be overlooked that in East Germany, too, the excessive number of people, in accordance with the Basic Law and civil society conventions, demands and lives a respectful coexistence. In Dresden, too, you stood up to the dull slogans in a commendable manner. Perhaps the humor that appeared in the Franconian Carnival 2015 in Veitshöchheim will also help: “Some are alarmed and see the country Islamized when a crescent moon is in the sky twice a month.” 123 The developments cannot yet be assessed , which have resulted from the immigration of an exceptionally high number of refugees since 2015, a significant proportion of whom come from Muslim countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The overwhelming willingness to help in all parts of the country and the recognition that rapid, extensive measures are necessary to integrate those who are likely to stay long or permanent leave some realistic figures - despite the frightening number of criminal attacks on refugees and their homes across the country Optimism too. Part of realism is that problems from a widespread macho culture - which cannot be attributed to any particular religion, but which are occasionally supported by religious attitudes - are tackled (see p. 250ff.), Be it with legal means such as after the devastating attacks on women in the New Year's Eve in Cologne and elsewhere, be it through upbringing. Unrealistic, dull general suspicions of xenophobic right-wing political history, such as the talk of a "flooding of Germany with expectant, slightly disappointing and violence-loving young men of predominantly Muslim faith" 124 and openly racist statements in politics and on internet blogs, however equally resolutely exposed and rejected.